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Lewis: Private Defamation: Mary Firestone, Mary Firestone

PRIVATE DEFAMATION: "MARY FIRESTONE,
MARY FIRESTONE?"
INTRODUCTION

Historically, private defamation received little attention until the 1974
Supreme Court Term when the High Court rendered its controversial decision
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.1 Then, almost two years later, the Court
decided Time Inc. v. Firestone,2 the first legitimate offspring of the 1974
Gertz decision. The Firestonecase not only exemplified the complexity and
imprecision of the private defamation law announced in Gertz, but also
illustrated the difficulty encountered by the state
courts in the interpretation
3
and implementation of the Gertz standards.
In theory, Firestonebegan where Gertz ended, and represented an attempt
by the Supreme Court to clarify rather than confuse; however, true clarification of the Court's position and the principles controlling private defamation
law was not forthcoming in the Firestone decision. Since the Court was
content to decide Firestoneon the basis of a technical flaw in the procedure
used by the Florida Supreme Court in its application of the Gertz fault
standard, it was able to postpone an immediate decision on the underlying
question: what constitutes sufficient journalistic fault to impose liability on
the press in a private defamation action? 4
In order to examine the full import of the Firestone opinion, it is first
necessary to explore the constitutional aspects of defamation law. 5 In the
early 1960's, history and current events dictated the need for an expanded
interpretation of the first amendment protection of speech and press, in order
to counteract the force of common-law libel actions brought by public
officials against those critical of their public activities. In the ten years which
followed, the seemingly boundless and ever-expanding scope of the first
amendment protection forced the Court to place limits on its application. For
this specific purpose, the Court designed and employed the public/private
distinction. The Court's usage of the public/private distinction is essential to a
comprehensive understanding of the Firestonecase and present-day private
defamation law.
I. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). But cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
2. -U.S. - 96, S. Ct. 958 (1976).
3. 418 U.S. at 347, 350.
4. -U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 970.
5. For a detailed discussion see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1976). [hereinafter
cited as Eaton]. For a survey of the law of defamation prior to the 1960's, see Developments in the
Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1956).
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THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
In the decade of decisions which preceded Gertz and Firestone, the6
political and social turmoil in America weighed heavily on the Court.
Although the extent of its effect is difficult to measure, its influence cannot be
ignored. Internally, the country was plagued by racial violence, while abroad
American soldiers died on the battlefields of Vietnam. The magnitude of
these problems forced the Court and country to realize that "voluntary or not,
we are all public men to some degree." 7
It was against this background that the Supreme Court announced its
revolutionary holding in The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.8 In New York
Times, the Court began the delicate task of formulating the "proper accommodation" between first amendment constitutional freedoms and the socially
desirable reputational interests protected by the maintenance of state defamation law. The New York Times opinion molded a constitutional privilege to
curb the use of state defamation law as a tool to suppress public criticism of
governmental action. The Court took the firm position that no state law should
be permitted to sabotage the constitutional mandate of the first amendment,
by impeding the9 publication of "public speech" or by interfering with the
"citizen-critic". Thus, in New York Times, the Supreme Court voiced its
strong commitment "to the principle that debate on public issues be uninhibited, robust and wide-open", 10 and sought to free the press from the threat of
state-imposed strict liability in instances where the press inadvertently
published information which was factually inaccurate or defamatory. 1 The
Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice.'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 2
In 1964 this enlightened constitutional privilege was not conceived as an
open-ended license. 13 It could be claimed by the press only in clearly defined
6. See Kalven, The New York Times Case:A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
7. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Mr. Sullivan, Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery,
Alabama, brought a civil action against the New York Times Company for allegedly libelous
statements in a full-page advertisement printed on March 29, 1960. The advertisement criticized
Mr. Sullivan's public conduct in his role as a public official.
9. Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
10. 376 U.S. at 270.
I1. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, "libelous
utterances" were not within the scope of first amendment protection. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476,
483 (1957).
12. 376 U.S. at 279-280. The privilege cited is referred to interchangeably in the text as the
New York Times privilege or the constitutional privilege.
13. For a complete discussion of constitutional privilege, seeW. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 118, at 819-833 (4th ed., 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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fact situations. With deliberate care, the Court limited the applicability of the
New York Times privilege to press reports or articles concerning the public
activities of public officials. 4
The concurrence of Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Douglas, in New
York Times served to reinforce the boundaries of the majority opinion:
This is not to say that the constitution protects defamatory statements
directed against the private conduct of a public official or private
citizen. .

.

. Purely private defamation has little to do with the

political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability
for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public
speech. .

.

. This, of course, cannot be said 'Where public officials

are concerned or where public matters are involved . . . . 5
Thus, a constitutional privilege was designed to assure public access to public
information. However, the rationale underlying the privilege did not extend
to encompass private defamations published by the press. This was outside
the sphere of legitimate public information.
16
Three terms later, the Supreme Court in Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts
sought a further accommodation of state defamation law and the constitutional freedoms of the first amendment:
Lest the New York Times rule become a talisman which gives the
press constitutionally adequate protection only in a limited field, or
what would be equally unfortunate, one which goes too far to
immunize the press from having to make just reparation for the
infliction of needless injury upon honor and reputation through false
publication. 11

Whereas the Court justified its 1964 decision in New York Times as a method
to protect political discussion, the determination in Curtis was not "an
adjudication which lay close to seditious libel. "18 The question before the
Curtis Court was whether the New York Times privilege would expand to
protect the press from libel actions brought not by public officials but by
"public figures":
[W]hose views and actions with respect to public issues and events
are often as much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior
of public officials with respect to the same issues and events.' 9
14. See PROSSER, supra, note 13. For some definitions of public officials, see Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1968), Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966).
15. 376 U.S. at 301-302. W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, p. 41 (1958).
16. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Mr. Butts, Athletic Director of the University of Georgia, sued
Curtis Publishing Company for libel, based on an article in the Saturday Evening Post which
accused Mr. Butts of conspiring to fix a football game between the University of Georgia and the
University of Alabama.
17. Id. at 135.
18. Id.at 153. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267 [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
19. 388 U.S. 130, 162. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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In holding that the privilege would expand to libel suits brought by public
figures, the Court relied on the similarities between the two classes of public
defamation plaintiffs. 2" Moreover, the Court conditioned the applicability of
the constitutional privilege for the protection of the press on two factors: the
and the legitimate public interest in the subject matter
plaintiff's public status,
21
of the publication.
nor does anything we have
In Curtis, the Court again defined limits: "...
said touch, in any way, libel or other tort actions not involving public figures
or matters of public interest.' '22 The Court disavowed any extension of the
constitutional privilege to matters or persons outside the public realm and
thereby excluded any possible application of the Curtis rationale to purely
private defamation actions.
The Supreme Court's next major defamation decision, Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.23 , presented another variation on the "public" theme. In
Rosenbloom, the plurality premised its decision, and justified the extension of
the constitutional privilege for the press, solely on the independent basis of
the legitimate public interest in the publication. 24 Unlike Curtis, the public
status of the plaintiff was no longer considered necessary to buttress the
constitutional incursion into state defamation law. The focus of Rosenbloom
was the public's need to know and its legitimate right to the published
information:
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period. Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60
S. Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).25
However logical the progression from public official to public figure to public
interest, the Rosenbloom plurality decision transformed the constitutional
privilege of New York Times and Curtis from one designed to protect
statements and reports concerning public persons and their activities, to a
privilege capable of insulating the publication of any so-called matter of
general or public interest.26 As Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality,
explained:
It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New
York Times the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon
state libel laws derives not so much from whether the plaintiff is a
,public official", "public figure" or "private individual", as it
20. Id. at 155. See Kalven, supra, note 18, at 288, 289.
21.

388 U.S. at 154.

22. Id. at 155, n. 19.
23. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
24. Id. at 44-45. For an interesting discussion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. seeNote,
The Expanding ConstitutionalProtection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation:
Predictabilityand the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1556 (1972).

25. 403 U.S. at 41.
26. Supra note 24, at 1547.
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derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest (citations omitted).
[W]e think the time has come forthrightly to announce that the
determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel
actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public
27
or general concern ...
Accordingly, the plurality encountered no difficulty in dismissing the previously relevant consideration of the "status" of the defamed plaintiff. The
plurality stated:
If a matter is the subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily'
choose to become involved.28
Although the Supreme Court was able to muster a plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom favoring the extension of the New York Times constitutional
privilege to protect the press and media when its publications were in the
public or general interest, this endorsement was shortlived. In Rosenbloom
there was general dissension among the Justices caused by the seemingly
infinite elasticity of the New York Times privilege.2 9 The scope of the
privilege as enunciated in Rosenbloom afforded the press such boundless
freedom that apparently it could publish to satisfy even the public's most
mundane and superficial curiosity, and still be protected from defamation
liability. 30 The long search for the proper accommodation of the competing
state and constitutional interests appeared to be abandoned. The constitutional concern for free publication of information in the public interest now
dominated to the virtual exclusion of any state interest in protecting a person's
reputation, even where the press published defamatory falsehoods directed
3
against private individuals. '
While Rosenbloom carefully sidestepped a direct discussion of the applicability of the New York Times privilege to purely private defamations, it was
the first major decision to include private figures within the bounds of the
constitutional privilege.
Thus, the idea that certain 'public' figures have voluntarily exposed
their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have
kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best a legal
fiction. Such a distinction could produce the paradoxical result of
dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because
they appear to involve private citizens while extending constitutional
encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of 'public figures'
that are not in the area of public or general concern. 32
27. 403 U.S. at 44. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 213. Cf. Kalven supra, note 18.
29. 403 U.S. 29, 62. (Harlan, J. dissenting); Id. at 78. (Marshall, J. and Stewart, J.
dissenting).
30. See Meikeljohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court since the New York Times v.
Sullivan 26 SYR. L. REV. 819 (1975).
31. 403 U.S. at 41-45.
32. Id. at 48.
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This over-inclusiveness of the plurality opinion was denounced by the
dissenting justices in Rosenbloom.33 While they believed the press deserved
some degree of constitutional protection, they were unanimously opposed to
extending Rosenbloom's carte-blanche version
of the New York Times
34
privilege to purely private defamation suits.
Thus, ten years after the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court,
dissatisfied with the rationale and result of Rosenbloom, rendered its opinion
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 35 In Gertz, the Court, for the first time,
focused directly on private defamation and the plight of the involuntary
private defamation plaintiff. Although there was questionable factual similarity between Rosenbloom36 and Gertz37 , the legal question was the same in
both cases: Would the constitutional privilege of New York Times protect a
publisher from liability for defamation of a private citizen? While the 1970
Supreme Court in Rosenbloom answered this question affirmatively, four
years later in Gertz, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom rationale that
".. . a private citizen involuntarily associated with a matter of general
interest had no recourse for injury to his reputation unless he could satisfy the
demanding requirements of the New York Times test." 38 The Gertz Court
stated that ". . . the state interest in compensating injury to reputation of
private individuals require[d] that a different rule should obtain.... 39
The opinion began with a careful analysis of the three approaches advocated for the purpose of reconciling the objectives of state defamation law
within the constitutional protections embodied in the first amendment.
One approach has been to extend the New York Times test to an
expanding variety of situations. Another has been to vary the level of
constitutional privilege for defamatory falsehood with the status of
the person defamed. And a third view would grant to the press and
broadcast media absolute immunity from liability for defamation.'
Gertz cited as inappropriate Rosenbloom's application of the first approach
in purely private defamation cases, since ". . . the need to avoid selfcensorship by the news media [was] however not the only societal value at
issue."41 According to the Court, the legitimate state interest served by the
33.
34.

Id.at 62-86.
Id.

35.

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Mr. Rosenbloom was a magazine distributor; a private individual who
sued a local radio station which broadcast news stories of his arrest for possession of obscene
literature.
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Mr. Gertz, an attorney and private citizen, sued the publisher of a
magazine for libel when it published an article about a murder trial of a police officer which
contained statements describing Gertz (the lawyer who represented the family of a murder victim
in a civil action for damages against the officer) as a "Communist-fronter", "Leninist" and
participant in various "Marxist" and "Red" activities.
38. 418 U.S. at 337.
39. Id. at 343.
40. Id. at 333.
41.

Id. at 341.
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law of defamation, in providing private individuals with compensation for
injury resulting from defamatory publications, also deserved proportionate
recognition. The Court found that the proper balance of these competing
interests would not be served either by the constitutional New York Times
standard of actual malice or by the common-law standard of strict liability,
since both standards produced severe results. 42 Therefore, a different standard was required when the defamed was a private citizen, 43 and
". where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement [made]
substantial damage to reputation apparent. '
To adequately protect the private defamation plaintiff, the Gertz Court
found itself compelled to follow the second approach: ". . varying the level
of constitutional privilege . . .with the status of the person defamed." 45 To
implement this approach and formulate a new standard, Gertz resurrected the
public status test of New York Times, as modified in Curtis, to provide the
lower courts with guidelines to apply in differentiating between public and
private defamation plaintiffs. 46 The Gertz decision was designed to delineate
those public persons, not protect them. Their reputational interests were
already adequately protected by the New York Times standard, and, as to
them Gertz made it clear that:
the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concern47
ing them.
The Gertz opinion was unique in that it focused on providing protection for
the private citizen. As to him, the press is entitled to make no assumptions. He
has not relinquished his right to legal protection of his good name or
reputation. "He has not voluntarily exposed himself, he has not accepted
public office nor assumed an 'influential role in ordering society.' He is more
vulnerable to injury and more deserving of recovery. "48 To protect his rights
and interests, the majority in Gertz promulgated new law. In order to assure
his protection Gertz announced that: "The states should retain substantial
latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood
injurious to the reputation of a private individual." 49 For private citizens,
Gertz permitted the states to hold the press liable for defamatory error under a
fault standard. At the same time, to afford sufficient protection for the news
42.

Id. at 346.

43.
44.
45.

See Note, Gertz v. Welch: Reviewing the Libel Action, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450 (1975).
418 U.S. at 348, n. II, citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
418 U.S. at 333. SeeNote, Adjusting the DefamationStandard,46 Miss. L.J. 279(1975).

46. Gertz defined public plaintiffs as follows: Persons who "occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence" (418 U.S. at 345); persons who by their "pervasive involvement
in the affairs of society" (Id. at 352); or by the "notoriety of their achievements" (Id. at 342),
have "general fame or notoriety in the community" (Id. at 351-352.).
47.

418 U.S. at 345.

48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 345, 346.
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media, the states' "substantial latitude" had court-defined boundaries. These
boundaries prevented the states from imposing liability without fault (strict
liability) and from awarding unjustified money damages in excess of the
actual injury.50 Gertz limited the legal remedy which the states could
legitimately afford the private defamed to compensation for actual injury, and
allowed recovery of presumed or punitive damages only upon proof of actual
51
malice.
"MARY FIRESTONE, MARY FIRESTONE?"

The scenario for the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
law of defamation 52 closely resembled a melodramatic episode in the finest
tradition of a television soap opera. The facts told the story of a highly
contested, highly publicized, divorce action between the heir of a tire fortune
and his ex-school teacher wife. The action took place in Palm Beach,
Florida-heaven of the gossip columnist and haven of the socially prominent,
money-made, money-married American aristocracy. And so the plot
unfolded.
Mary sued Russell for separate maintenance, but no divorce. Russell
counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The
Florida Circuit Court granted the counterclaimed divorce stating that
.. . neither party [was] domesticated, within the meaning of that term as
used by the Supreme Court of Florida, therefore, the marriage should be
dissolved.' 53
After receiving information from four news sources, Time, "The Weekly
News Magazine" published in Milestones", this report:
Divorced. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune:
Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a one time Palm
Beach school-teacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery;
after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The
17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl. '54

Shortly thereafter, Mary asked Time to retract. Time refused and Mary
brought suit against Time for libel in the Florida Circuit Court.5 5 The jury
rendered a verdict for Mary and the court assessed a $100,000 damage award
against Time. In due course, both the Florida District Court of Appeals 56 and
the Supreme Court of Florida5 7 affirmed the lower court judgement for Mary.
50.

Id. at 349, 350. See Note, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,:

THE IMPACT ON THE STATE LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 69 Nw. L. REV. 960 (1975).
51. 418 U.S. at 349, 350.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Time, Inc. v. Firestone - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
Id.at 958.
TIME MAGAZINE, December 22, 1967 at p.77.
- U.S. -, 96S. Ct. 958, 964 at n. 1.
279 So. 2d 389 (1973).
305 So. 2d 172 (1974).
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The case reached the United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari by
Time. Time argued that the Florida judgement "violat[ed] its rights under58the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."
Time's first contention was that the Florida judgment awarding damages to
Mary was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's prior holdings in
New York Times 9 and Curtis,' which prohibited state courts from awarding
damages to both public officials and public figures based on defamation,
6
unless it proved that the publication was made with "actual malice." '
Secondly, Time claimed that the constitutional strictures enunciated in
New York Times and later applied in Rosenbloom, 62 clearly required that
the publication of accounts of judicial proceedings, as a matter of inherent
general or public interest, must be afforded constitutional protection. Time
rationalized that even false or defamatory interpretations of facts and conclusions in public judicial proceedings deserved the constitutional protection of
the New York Times standard. 63
The FirestoneCourt, taking a firm and unequivocal stand against greater
constitutional protection for the press in private defamation cases, rejected
both of Time's arguments. 64 The Court analogized Firestone to Gertz,
rejecting the claim of the New York Times constitutional privilege and
relegating Time to the alternative protections available under the Gertz
private defamation standard.
At the outset, the Court found Mary not to be a "public figure" as defined
in Gertz.65 After restating the Gertz description of voluntary public figures,
the Court concluded that Mary's only conceivable role of "especial prominence" 66 was related solely to her participation in the social activities of Palm
Beach society. While for the residents of Palm Beach and perhaps other
67
similarly wealth-oriented communities her divorce was a "cause celebre,"
for Mary, it was the legal vehicle of escape from a troubled marriage. The
Court found that Mary did not "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular
,68 Instead, she
public controversy in order to influence the resolution .
was involuntarily thrust to the forefront by the press and made the brunt of a
press-created public controversy. To satisfy the public's curiosity and desire
for gossip, knowing that the sordid details of a millionaire's divorce sell
58.

-

U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 958.

59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
61. Actual malice was defined by the Supreme Court as: "Knowledge that (the statement)
was false or reckless disregard of whether it was true or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964).
62. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
63. See Time Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
64.

-

U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 965.

65. Id. at 965-966. But see Id. at 979 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
66.

-

67.
68.

Id.
Id.

U.S. -,

96 S. Ct. at 965.
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magazines, 69 Time made Mary's intensely private struggle to obtain a divorce

a "public controversy", and transformed Mary into a press-made "public
figure."
The Gertz decision recognized that active and volitional involvement in
certain public controversies would raise a private person to the status of a
public figure; but Firestone held that "dissolution of a marriage through
judicial proceedings [was] not the sort of "public controversy" referred to in
Gertz. .. ."70 Moreover, the Supreme Court made it clear that "all
controversies of interest to the public' '71 were not by legal and judicial

definition, "public controversies." The Court rejected Time's argument that
involvement in a public judicial proceeding automatically transformed the
participants into public figures. The Court commented that:
. . .the majority . . . [were] drawn into a public forum largely

against their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress
available to them or to defend themselves against actions brought by
the. State or by others.72

The Court refused to make private individuals sacrifice their private interests
by their presence in the public court room or by their participation in the legal
process. According to the Firestonemajority, Mary was neither a voluntary
nor involuntary "public figure", but rather a private citizen.
Thus the Supreme Court rebuffed Time's claim to the constitutional
protection of the New York Times privilege, holding that no privilege
attached when a purely private citizen was defamed. Only proof of fault, not
proof of "actual malice", need be adduced by the private defamation
plaintiff. 73 Unquestionably, the Court found that under the circumstances in
Firestone, Time's limited interest was sufficiently protected by the constitutional limitations stated in Gertz.
Next, the Court explicitly denied Time's request for an automatic extension
of the New York Times constitutional privilege to all press reports of judicial
proceedings." While the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
protect the "publication of truthful information contained in official court
records open to public inspection", 7 it denied the argument that all press
reports of judicial proceedings deserved unqualified first amendment protection. Unequivocally, the Court declined to extend the rationale of Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn76 to press reports such as those in Gertz which
69.

For a general discussion, see Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal

Regulation of Public Communications. 46 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1968).
70. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 965.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 967.
73. Id. at 966.
74. Id. See PROSSER note 13 supra § 114, at 778. The common-law provided an absolute
privilege for the participants in judicial proceedings.
75.

-

U.S.-, 96 S. Ct. at 966, CitingCox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).

The Cox case was an action for invasion of privacy.
76. Id. In Cox the Court commented on the availability of the defense of truth: "The Court
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contained inaccurate, defamatory or false statements: "Our decision in that
case should make it clear that no such blanket privilege for reports of judicial
proceedings is to be found in the Constitution." 77 Moreover, the Firestone
denial of a blanket constitutional privilege for reports of judicial proceedings
served to further expand the Court's basic premise in Gertz, that first
amendment constitutional protection could no longer be invoked on the basis
of subject matter classifications. 78 Thus, whenever the press is compelled by
the public interest to report particular judicial proceedings, the appropriate
protection is extended on the basis of factual correctness. 79 If the publication
is truthful and accurate then it is protected under the Supreme Court's decision
in Cox; ° however, should the publication contain incorrect or false information then no first amendment or common-law privilege attaches.
Furthermore, the FirestoneCourt held that Time's other first amendment
claim premised on the Court's holding in Time, Inc. v. Pape8' did not apply in
a case of private defamation.8 2 When reporting about private citizens, the
press is only protected by the rules annourueed in Gertz: "These are a
prohibition against imposing liability without fault. . . and the requirement
that compensatory awards be supported by competent evidence concerning
the injury.''83 According to Firestone, the imposition of a fault standard
"provide[d] an adequate safeguard for the constitutionally protected interests
"84
of the press and afford[ed] it a tolerable margin for error ....
Thus, having chosen to adhere strictly to the Gertz precedent the Firestone
Court was compelled to determine whether the evidence produced by Mary
satisfied the requirements of Gertz.8 5 The FirestoneCourt had no problem
with "the requirement that compensatory awards be supported by competent
evidence concerning the injury.''86 It found that the jury was properly
. . . carefully left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth amendments require that
truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by a private person as
distinguished from a public official or public figure." Id. at 490.
77. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 958, 966. (The Court here is referring to the decision in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "Indeed, this article upon which the Gertz libel action
was based purported to be a report on the murder trial ofa Chicago police officer. See418 U.S. at
325-326."
78. 418 U.S. at 344-346.
79. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See Note, The Right of Privacy
versus Freedom of the Press, 24 EMORY L.J. 1205 (1975).
80. Id. Since no constitutional privilege attached on the basis of subject matter, the fact that
a judicial proceeding is a matter of public interest or concern was of no consequence; the press
would only be protected when it could demonstrate the truth and accuracy of the report.
81. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
82. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 958, 967, at n.4. In Time Inc. v. Pape, the Court apparently based its
distinction on plaintiff Pape's status as a public official, and therefore applied the actual malice
standard. The Court found that a "rational interpretation of an ambiguous document" did not
amount to proof of "actual malice"; therefore the press report was protected by the New York
Times privilege. But, in Firestone the plaintiff was not a public official nor a public figure, so the
press was not entitled to claim the constitutional protection of actual malice in the first instance.
83. 418 U.S. at 347, 350. See Eaton at n. 5 supra.
84. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 967 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 968-969.
86. Id. at 968.
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instructed, and the verdict for Mary affirmatively reflected the finding that
Time's inaccurate publication, referring to Mary as an adulteress, had in fact
caused Mary great concern and anxiety, especially in relation to the effect it
would have on her young son when he grew older. 87 Moreover, the Court
matter of factly dismissed Time's argument that Mary could not recover for
defamation since she did not claim injury to her reputation. Again, the
Firestone Court sought support from Gertz.
In that opinion we made it clear that States could base awards on
elements other than injury to reputation, specifically listing . . .
'personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering' as examples
8
of injuries which might be compensated.
Therefore, the fact that Mary withdrew her claim for damages based on injury
to her reputation was of no consequence. The Court totally rejected Time's
argument and held that there could be recovery for defamation absent a claim
for reputational injury, since "Florida ha[d] obviously decided to permit
recovery for other injuries." 89 In conclusion, the FirestoneCourt, finding no
basis to interfere with the Florida jury's findings of fact, would not conter9
mand the damage award for Mary. 0
It was the initial Gertz requirement, necessary to support Mary's damage
award, which proved to be lacking and finally fatal in Firestone. Gertz
required a finding on the state court level of "evidence of some fault on the
part of the defendant charged with the publishing of the defamatory material."' Unfortunately for Mary, the Supreme Court held that this finding of
fault had never been made by the Florida jury or at any time by a higher
Florida court. Indeed, the question of fault had never been submitted to the
jury:
. . .under Florida law the only findings required for determination of
liability were whether the article was defamatory, whether it was true
and whether the defamation, if any, caused . . . harm. 92
Nor had the Florida Supreme Court made a sufficient finding of fault to meet
the Gertz requirement. The FirestoneCourt circuitously noted the fatal flaw
in the Florida Supreme Court holding: "There is nothing in the Court's
opinion which appears to make any reference to the relevance of some
concept of fault in determining petitioner's liability." 93 Thus, in the final
87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89. Id; Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971). In Monitor the Supreme
Court stated that "damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel."
90. See Time Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So.2d 389 (Fla. App. 1973), rev'd 305 So.2d 172 (Fla.
1974) cert. granted421 U.S. 909 (1975).

91. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 968.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 969 and note 7. "Furthermore, this erroneous reporting is clear and convincing
evidence of the negligence in certain segments of the news media in gathering the news. Gertz v.
Welch, Inc., supra. Pursuant to Florida law in effect at the time of the divorce judgment, Section
61.08. Florida Statutes, a wife found guilty of adultery could not be awarded alimony. Since
petitioner had been awarded alimony, she had not been found guilty of adultery nor had the
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analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings based on the following conclusion:
• . . Without some finding of fault by the judge or jury in the circuit

court, we would have to attribute to the Supreme Court of Florida
• . . not merely an intention to affirm the finding of the lower court,

but an intention to find such a fact in the first instance. 4
In the absence of a conscious and definitive finding of fault at some level of
the state court system, there could
be no constitutionally permissable imposi95
tion of liability on the press.
CONCLUSION

Major questions in the area of private defamation law remain unanswered
by the Firestoneopinion. Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of Firestonewas
its general ambiguity and lack of new direction. The Court did not clearly
explain the concept of journalistic fault, and its constitutionally permissable
application in private defamation suits remained elusive. The Court continued
in its refusal to define explicitly for the states what type of fault standard
would be held in compliance with Gertz and under what circumstances. In
private defamation suits where "the substance of the defamatory falsehood
[made] substantial damage to reputation apparent," 96 the concurring opinion
of Justices Powell and Stewart indicated that, "there [was] no first amendment constraint against allowing recovery upon proof of negligence. " 97 In
fact, the concurrence actually explored and hypothesized the outcome of
Firestone on the assumption that, in the future, Florida would apply a
negligence standard.9 8 The majority, however, was silent. The ultimate
determination of the definition and correct application of a fault/negligence
standard in the context of professional journalism was not reached by
99
the Firestonemajority. Moreover, the forceful dissent of Justice Brennan,
cautioned the Court in Firestoneto remember the rationale of Cox, °0and the
importance of exposing public judicial proceedings to public scrutiny.
Crucial . . .was the determination that a 'reasonable man' standard
for imposing liability for invasion of privacy interests is simply
divorce been granted on the ground of adultery. A careful examination of the final decree prior to
publication would have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of
extreme cruelty, and thus the wife would have been saved the humiliation of being accused of
adultery in a nationwide magazine. This is a flagrant example of 'journalistic negligence'." 304
So.2d, at 178.
94. Id. at 970.
95. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Note, Defamation Law in the Wake
of Gertz, 69 Nw. L. REV. 960 (1975); Eaton at note 5 supra.
96. - U.S.-, 96 S. Ct. 958, 970. (Citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. !2, 1966).
97. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. at 970.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 973.
100. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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inadequate to the task of safeguarding against 'timidity and selfcensorship' in reporting judicial proceedings.0 °

For Justice Brennan, Cox permitted only one conclusion: "Clearly, the
inadequacy of any such standard is no less in the related area of liability for
defamation resulting from inadvertent error in reporting such
02
proceedings."1
Since, in the area of private defamation law, Firestonefailed to supply the
missing constant-proper application of the fault standard-the constitutional equation sought after in Gertz remained incomplete and unbalanced.
Perhaps the message of Firestoneis that further state legislative and judicial
experiments are needed before Gertz becomes a truly workable formula for
imposing liability on the press for private defamation.
CONSTANCE M, LEWIS
101.
102.

- U.S. -,
Id.

96S. Ct. at975.
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